When Gaming Goes Heads Up with the Bankruptcy Code: Unique Restructuring Issues for Gaming Businesses in Difficult Economic Times by Cica, Dawn M. & Macauley, Laury M.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\3-1\NVG104.txt unknown Seq: 1  6-JUN-12 12:26
WHEN GAMING GOES HEADS UP
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ECONOMIC TIMES1
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Laury M. Macauley**
The intersection of gaming and bankruptcy law has long presented legal
conflicts that have never been easily reconciled. This problem has been exacer-
bated in recent years by the current global and national economic turbulence
that has greatly impacted the casino gaming industry and has led to a sizeable
increase in the number of businesses using bankruptcy to restructure and/or
liquidate assets.2
Many institutional investors on Wall Street, as well as private equity firms
and large national and international banks, either own equity in, or have lent
money to, public and private gaming companies. With creditors anticipating
that casino revenues would remain at historically high levels or would continue
1 This article is an expansion of a previously published article. See Dawn M. Cica, Laury
Macauley & Sean M. McGuinness, In and Out of Bankruptcy: Weathering the Financial
Storm in Gaming, NEV. GAMING LAW., Sept. 2011, at 17, available at http://www.lrlaw.
com/files/Uploads/Documents/Nevada_Gaming_Lawyer.pdf.
* Dawn Cica is a partner in Lewis and Roca LLP’s Bankruptcy Practice Group in Las
Vegas. She has over twenty years of experience in all aspects of transactional work,
including financing transactions, gaming transactions, real estate transactions and all
transactional matters related to restructuring and bankruptcy, including negotiating and
documenting strategic resolutions, cash collateral matters, debtor in possession financings
and asset sales. Ms. Cica has been involved in the bankruptcies of major Nevada resort
properties, including Station Casinos, the Aladdin Resort, Riviera and Resort at Summerlin.
She works with the Lewis and Roca’s Gaming Practice Group in relation to gaming
transactions, including lending, leasing, management agreements, acquisitions and sales and
casino related restructuring matters.
** Laury Macauley is Of Counsel in Lewis and Roca LLP’s Bankruptcy and Creditor’s
Rights Practice Group in Reno. She has over twenty years of experience in restructuring
issues, including all aspects of bankruptcy, business law and related litigation in state and
federal courts. She has counseled and assisted debtor, creditor, and trustee clients in all
aspects of chapter 7, 11 and 13 bankruptcy cases, including proceedings in the Herbst
Gaming, Station Casinos, Del Taco, and Liquor Barn chapter 11 cases.
2 The five-year period between 2006 and 2010 saw business filings nationwide rise almost
threefold—in 2006, there were 19,695 filings as compared to 56,282 during fiscal year 2010.
Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudi-
ciary.aspx.
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to climb, many of these loans were made at the top of the market with high debt
leverage ratios. However, because gaming is essentially an entertainment
industry, the economic tumult precipitously reduced consumer discretionary
spending, leading to deflated casino revenue.3
Moreover, businesses in the gaming industry have faced an onslaught of
additional competition nationwide. States like California have allowed a sub-
stantial expansion of Indian gaming.4 Moreover, a myriad of states across the
nation have expanded authority for gaming enterprises to include, among other
things, the addition of traditional casino gaming at racetrack facilities.5
As a result of these economic forces and the resulting decrease in discre-
tionary income, casino profitability has suffered and major capital projects have
been delayed or shelved. Additionally, many gaming companies have been una-
ble to meet their income or other covenants in their debt obligations. In fact,
Nevada’s 256 largest casinos netted a loss of nearly $4 billion in the 2011 fiscal
year.6 Faced with such challenges, and the particular conflicts inherent in the
gaming and bankruptcy legal constructs, both lenders and debtors in the gaming
industry have been forced to develop creative solutions unique to casino busi-
nesses, whether in or out of the bankruptcy context.
I. RESTRUCTURING ALTERNATIVES
In the wake of financial defaults, gaming debtors and lenders often turn
first to restructuring options in order to avoid the filing of a bankruptcy. Never-
theless, the novel aspects of the casino business still present numerous difficul-
ties for lenders.
Casinos are typically financed with a combination of secured and
unsecured debt much in the same way as any other business. They own prop-
erty, certain of which they can pledge to secure their debt. Unlike general com-
mercial loans, however, the lender’s tripartite relationship to its collateral and
the borrower is regulated by state gaming laws. For example, in Nevada, the
pledge of privately owned stock in gaming companies requires the prior
approval of gaming authorities before they can become effective. A gaming
license itself is not subject to encumbrance, since it is considered a revocable
privilege to conduct gaming activities.7 Nevertheless, lenders routinely take the
3 AMERICAN GAMING ASS’N, STATE OF THE STATES: THE AGA SURVEY OF CASINO
ENTERTAINMENT 5 (2011) (According to the American Gaming Association, total U.S. con-
sumer spending on commercial casino gaming declined in 2008 and 2009, only to rebound
slightly with an increase of 0.9% in 2010. In Nevada, the increase was a modest 0.1%.).
4 Id. at 23.
5 Id. at 4 (As of December 31, 2010, there were 456 Tribal casinos nationwide, covering
twenty-eight different states; there were forty-five racetrack casinos, covering twelve
states.).
6 NEVADA STATE GAMING CONTROL BOARD, NEVADA GAMING ABSTRACT 2011 (Jan. 6,
2012) (reporting that Nevada’s 256 largest casinos generated a net loss of $3,996,656,422.00
in the 2011 fiscal year).
7 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.220(2) (2009) states in part, “No state gaming license may be
assigned either in whole or in part;” see also, Nev. Gaming Reg. 8A.010(4) (regulations of
the Nevada Gaming Commission, which defines “personal property gaming collateral” and
“operating license” separately).
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position that the “enterprise value” of the casino constitutes intangible personal
property, allowing them to assert a security interest in that goodwill.8
In addition to those regulatory issues, the necessary set-up of a casino
business itself presents unique challenges to the lender. One of the most impor-
tant characteristics of the gaming business is the typically large amount of cash
on hand in the casino. This cash is located in the casino cage, throughout the
casino in gaming machines, at the gaming tables, and is represented by chips.
Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Section 9-313(a), a lender’s
security interest in that cash can only be perfected by possession.9 However,
because cash is the lynchpin of the gaming enterprise (and casinos need to
maintain a minimum bankroll on hand per gaming regulations),10 a lender’s
actual possession of such cash (and perfection of its security interest thereby)
would prohibit the continual and profitable operation of the casino.
Even if the lender was granted a security interest in gaming tables and slot
machines, the lender does not automatically have a security interest in the cash
generated by the use of that gaming equipment.11 Although there are no cases
that directly address whether the revenue generated by such gaming equipment
constitutes “proceeds” under the UCC, it is questionable whether such a posi-
tion would prevail, because cash neither diminishes the value of the lender’s
collateral when generated, nor is generated from the sale or transmutation of
the collateral.12 If the revenue does not constitute “proceeds,” this is injurious
to the secured creditor’s interest after a bankruptcy filing, because a security
interest does not attach to post-petition revenue unless it constitutes “proceeds,
products, offspring, or profits . . . .” of the pre-petition collateral.13 Further-
more, if an “interest”14 in this revenue cannot be established, a lender may be
helpless to stop a casino from freely using cash on hand, despite the fact that
such cash may have been earned through the use of encumbered gaming
equipment.
Due to the uncertainty of these various legal issues, lenders are increas-
ingly requiring that borrowers structurally separate the ownership of the real
estate from the operation, and that borrowers operate pursuant to such leases.15
As part of this structure, the lender generally requires the borrower to deposit
cash into accounts controlled by the lender, which then “waterfalls” out to pay
approved operating expenses and debt obligations.
8 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.510(1) (2009).
9 U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (2001).
10 See Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 6.150 (Mar. 2006) (regulations of the Nevada Gaming
Commission).
11
“Gaming equipment” includes, gaming devices, cashless wagering systems, and associ-
ated equipment as defined in NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.0155, 463.014, 463.0136 (2009).
12 See, e.g., In re S & J Holding Corp., 42 B.R. 249, 250 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (cash
revenues generated by video game machines and vending machines do not constitute
“proceeds”).
13 See 11 U.S.C. §552(b)(1) (2006).
14 Id. § 363(a).
15 As of the July 28, 2009 filing date of the chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of Station Casinos,
Inc, all of debtors’ real estate was owned by separate entities from that of its operating
entities, making for a jointly-administered case of seventeen separate debtors. See In re Sta-
tion Casinos, Inc., No. BK-09-52477, 2010 Bankr. Lexis 5673 (Bankr. D.Nev. 2010).
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In addition to the issues that arise in connection with the grant and perfec-
tion of a lender’s interest in collateral, loans to licensed gaming companies
often create unique situations that impact a lender’s ability to foreclose on the
collateral. In Nevada, lenders cannot assume control of a Nevada gaming busi-
ness without prior gaming regulatory approvals, generally requiring application
and a finding as to the lender’s suitability.16 The issue of how much decision
making power a lender can have over a casino or gaming company without
being deemed to be in control is often complex and difficult to predict. Certain
foreclosures of stock or equity also require prior approval of the lender by the
gaming regulatory authorities.17 Although gaming devices may be foreclosed
upon without prior approval from regulators, approvals are required in order to
sell or further transfer those gaming devices. When the devices are ultimately
transferred, the transfer must be to someone who already holds a manufac-
turer’s or distributor’s license.18 On the other hand, real property may be fore-
closed upon without any gaming authority consent, which is why sophisticated
lenders are requiring the bifurcation of the real estate from the operation.
For these reasons, sophisticated borrowers may attempt to use the gaming
regulatory structure to their advantage against unsophisticated lenders. A bor-
rower can use a lender’s inability to take over and conduct gaming operations
without the appropriate licenses as leverage to renegotiate the terms of a loan
transaction after a borrower default. Accordingly, lenders do not want the bor-
rowers to force their hand in such an instance, because the only quick way to
gain control of a gaming borrower’s business would be to cease gaming opera-
tions, which would decimate the value of the collateral.
Increasingly, with the new borrowing structures, lenders are finding ways
to restructure without the cost and delay of a bankruptcy filing. Oftentimes,
lenders use leverage against personal guarantors to gain negotiating power. For
example, the parties to the senior secured loan on the M Resort agreed that,
rather than a foreclosure or entering bankruptcy, the parties would market and
auction the property.19 Similarly, the Planet Hollywood lenders and owners
agreed to sell the property to Caesars Entertainment, f.k.a. Harrah’s Entertain-
ment, rather than filing a chapter 11, which would have constituted yet another
16 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.160-170 (2009). For example, on December 23, 2011,
the Nevada Gaming Commission found Ronald Paul Johnson “suitable” to serve as receiver
for the Las Vegas Hilton, including its gaming business, in advance of his appointment by
the Court (see more detailed discussion, infra). An applicant cannot be found “suitable”
unless the Commission is satisfied that the applicant is:
(a) A person of good character, honesty and integrity;
(b) A person whose prior activities, criminal record, if any, reputation, habits and associations do
not pose a threat to the public interest of this State or to the effective regulation and control of
gaming or charitable lotteries, or create or enhance the dangers of unsuitable, unfair or illegal
practices, methods and activities in the conduct of gaming or charitable lotteries or in the carry-
ing on of the business and financial arrangements incidental thereto; and
(c) In all other respects qualified to be licensed or found suitable consistently with the declared
policy of the State.
Id. § 463.170.
17 See Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 8.010 (2011).
18 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.162.
19 See Howard Stutz, M Resort Facing Sale, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 16, 2010, http://
www.lvrj.com/business/lloyds-banking-group-soliciting-bids-for-m-resort-100804429.html.
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bankruptcy for the former Aladdin property.20 More recently, the Palms
announced that the owners had sold 98% of the equity in a transaction that
erased $400 million in debt.21
In the case of the Hard Rock, the senior secured lender and one of the
mezzanine lenders made a deal to avoid property closure or bankruptcy.22
Essentially, the mezzanine lender (which was secured by an upstream grant of
the ownership of the borrower) contracted with a licensable casino tenant to
take over casino operations once the mezzanine lender foreclosed on the bor-
rower’s equity interest.23 The mezzanine lender filed applications with the
Nevada State Gaming Control Board and obtained a temporary waiver of
licensing so the foreclosure could take place and control of the casino opera-
tions could be passed along to a newly licensed casino tenant thereafter.24 The
licensure of the casino tenant by the Nevada Gaming Commission occurred at
the same hearing in which the lender’s temporary waiver was obtained.25
In the recent case of the Las Vegas Hilton (“LV Hilton”), the lenders
applied to the district court for a receiver under the Nevada statutes.26 After an
evidentiary hearing at which the judge questioned the interplay between gam-
ing and a secured lender’s remedies, the district court judge appointed a
receiver for the non-gaming properties.27 The lenders obtained appointment of
a receiver who had previously agreed to buy the LV Hilton, and the receiver
concurrently filed for a gaming license under N.R.S. § 463.28 The final order
turned the LV Hilton’s assets and operations over to the receiver, contingent
upon the Nevada Gaming Commission’s finding of suitability, which was
determined subsequently.29
Nevertheless, if the borrower and the lenders cannot agree on a consensual
restructuring,30 borrowers will often file a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in
order to gain negotiating leverage over the lenders. The casino industry is natu-
rally favored in this respect, simply because of the amount of cash it generates
20 Harrah’s Moves Ahead with Possible Planet Hollywood Acquisition, LAS VEGAS SUN,
Nov. 30, 2009, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/nov/30/harrahs-moves-ahead-possi-
ble-planet-hollywood-acqu/; Harrah’s Officially Takes Over Planet Hollywood, LAS VEGAS
SUN, Feb. 19, 2010, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/feb/19/harrahs-officially-takes-
over-planet-hollywood/.
21 Chris Sieroty, Regulators Recommend Sale of Palms Majority Stake, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Nov. 2, 2011, http://www.lvrj.com/business/regulators-recommend-sale-of-palms-majority-
stake-133108318.html.
22 Chris Sieroty, State Gaming Officials To Discuss Hard Rock Fate, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Feb. 4, 2011, http://www.lvrj.com/business/state-gaming-officials-to-discuss-hard-rock-fate-
115298134.html.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Stipulation and Order for the Appointment of a Receiver, Goldman Sachs Mortgage Co.
v. Colony Resorts LVH Acquisitions, LLC, No. A-11-648281-B (Nev. Dist. Ct. Jan. 6, 2012)
[hereinafter Goldman Sachs Stipulation and Order].
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.160 (2009).
29 Goldman Sachs Stipulation and Order, supra note 26.
30 This might also be true if the granting of receivers over gaming properties becomes more
accessible to lenders.
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and the difficulties lenders face with respect to perfection of their security inter-
ests. As they say in the industry, “he who has the cash wins.”
Bankruptcy law generally eliminates a lender’s ability to obtain new liens
post-petition in “after-acquired” property.31 Instead, a lender may only claim a
security interest in property that constitutes “proceeds” of property encumbered
pre-petition.32 To qualify as a “proceed,” the property must “necessarily
derive[ ] from the sale, exchange or other dispensation of other encumbered
property.”33 Stated another way, only property that is directly attributable to
pre-petition collateral, without the addition of estate resources, can qualify as
proceeds.34 Courts addressing the general issue of what constitutes proceeds
have consistently held that revenue derived from the use of collateral, as
opposed to the disposition or diminution of collateral, are not “proceeds.”35
As a result, once in bankruptcy, casinos generally argue that lenders have
no interest in cash generated from the use of encumbered gaming equipment.
There are no published opinions directly addressing the issue. Based on deci-
sions that have been issued dealing with types of revenue generated by other
kinds of machines, including the Las Vegas Monorail, it appears that it may be
more difficult than ever for a lender to rebut such a contention successfully.36
This point becomes clear by simply examining the day-to-day operations of a
casino. Patrons enter casinos with the intention of using the equipment (slot
machines, tables, video games, etc.) for the thrill of possibly realizing a big
return on their wager. However, no matter how large the wager, no lease or
ownership in the inventory or equipment of the casino is intended or expected
to be granted to a gambler in exchange for his or her wager.
However, even if a lender could demonstrate that cash generated from
gaming equipment qualified as proceeds, the hurdle of commingling would
remain. In order to prohibit the use of cash collateral, a lender must demon-
strate a legally cognizable interest in the collateral.37 When an interest is
claimed in proceeds, the proceeds must be reasonably identifiable.38 In other
words, “once a debtor deposits cash proceeds into an account and commingles
it with other money, the [ability to identify] a secured creditor’s proceeds is
destroyed unless the secured creditor can prove the money currently in the
debtor’s account corresponds to its collateral.”39
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006); In re Stallings, 290 B.R. 777, 783 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2003).
32 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006).
33 Philip Morris Capital Corp. v. Bering Trader, Inc. (In re Bering Trader), 944 F.2d 500,
502 (9th Cir. 1991); see also, U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (2001) (defining proceeds as “whatever
is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral . . . .”).
34 See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 552.02[2][a] (Alan  N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2011); In re Delco Oil, Inc., 365 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).
35 See In re S & J Holding Corp., 42 B.R. 249, 250 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); CLC Equip.
Co. v. Brewer (In re Value-Added Commc’n, Inc.), 139 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1998); In re
Las Vegas Monorail, 429 B.R. 317, 333-34 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
36 See In re Las Vegas Monorail, 429 B.R. at 342-45.
37 11 U.S.C. § 363(a).
38 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.9315(b) (2009).
39 Arkinson v. Frontier Asset Mgmt., LLC (In re Skagit Pac. Corp.), 316 B.R. 330, 338
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004).
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Unlike many other businesses, casinos operate with money cages. Cash,
coins, and chips obtained from patrons on the casino floor end up in these
cages. Although gambling may account for the majority, this revenue is gener-
ated from a variety of sources. As such, difficulty arises with respect to identifi-
cation of the specific proceeds generated from the use of gaming equipment.
Either way, a casino lender enters the bankruptcy process at a disadvan-
tage. Without an encumbrance on cash collateral, a gaming business can use
these funds for the administration of the bankruptcy.40 This pool of cash, cou-
pled with the fact that most casinos have positive EBITDA,41 in many cases
gives the borrower the leverage it needs over its lenders.
Despite this advantage, most parties recognize that a restructuring,
whether done through the bankruptcy process or not, should allow the casino
business to remain open, employees to remain employed, and provide a mecha-
nism for the borrower and its creditors to explore ways by which to maximize
the value of the bankrupt company to, in turn, maximize the return to creditors.
II. IMPACT OF GAMING ISSUES IN BANKRUPTCIES
Increasingly, borrowers and senior lenders may have agreed to restructure
the gaming company. However, pursuant to a structure that requires the bor-
rower to file a bankruptcy petition to achieve the terms of the agreement, if
there are non-consenting junior creditor groups who have claims that need to be
addressed in order to allow the restructured company to have a fresh start and
to get through their bankruptcy case quickly. Sometimes this is referred to as a
“prepackaged plan” or “prepack,” because the borrower and senior lenders
agree on the terms of the plan before the case is filed. Such pre-packaged plans
were seen in the Station Casinos and Riviera cases, among others.
Whether or not there is an attempt at a “prepackaged plan” under the
umbrella of a restructuring deal, casino debtors are turning to bankruptcy fil-
ings in significant numbers to assist them in addressing financial difficulties.
The bankruptcies of casino debtors typically follow three different paths:
1) Chapter 11 reorganization with a debtor that generates enough cash
flow, and/or has significant debtor-in-possession financing. These two factors
will in turn operate to justify the bankruptcy court in allowing the debtor-in-
possession to continue operation during the bankruptcy, and to offer a plan of
reorganization to its creditors and to the bankruptcy court. Examples of this
type of bankruptcy were: Herbst Gaming,42 Station Casinos,43 the Riviera,44
Stratosphere Casino and Hotel,45 Fitzgeralds Gaming Corporation,46 and the
40 See 11 U.S.C. §552(a) (property acquired after commencement of case not covered by
pre-petition security agreement).
41
“EBITDA” stands for “earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization” and
is often used as an indicator of a company’s financial performance.
42 Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Insurcorp (In re Zante, Inc.), No. 3:10-cv-00231, 2010 WL
5477768 (Bankr. D. Nev. Dec. 29, 2010).
43 In re Station Casinos Inc., No. 09-52477, 2011 WL 6813603 (Bankr. D. Nev. Dec. 21,
2011).
44 In re Riviera Holdings Corp., No. 10-22910 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
45 Mcdonald’s Corp. v. Stratosphere Corp. (In re Stratosphere Gaming Corp.), 23 F. App’x
749 (9th Cir. 2001).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\3-1\NVG104.txt unknown Seq: 8  6-JUN-12 12:26
30 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:23
Aladdin Casino and Hotel.47 In each of these instances, the casinos were able to
stay open and continue operations, while a reorganization plan was circulated
to the creditors and the court.
2) Chapter 11 reorganization with a debtor that either (a) does not gener-
ate enough cash flow to continue operations, or (b) does not have adequate
debtor-in-possession financing to finance the bankruptcy long enough to com-
plete the required plan of reorganization process. In this instance, the bank-
ruptcy court may order a sale of the debtor’s assets, pursuant to Bankruptcy
Code section 363, which results in the property being marketed for sale.48 In
such an instance, a stalking horse bidder may be contracted with to make a
minimum, opening bid of the assets at auction.49 In any event, an auction will
usually take place under the bankruptcy court’s supervision. In this scenario,
the debtor-in-possession’s equity owners are able to participate in the auction
and bid for the assets alongside non-owners. Examples of this type of bank-
ruptcy were: The Resort at Summerlin,50 Stateline Casino,51 and the Siena
Hotel Spa & Casino.52 In the first two instances, the casinos stayed open with
the agreement that a sale process would be immediately initiated. In the case of
the Siena, the gaming business ran out of sufficient funds to operate under state
regulations and voluntarily shut down before the sale was conducted.53
3) Chapter 7 liquidation with a debtor that does not generate positive cash
flow, and does not have the ability to obtain debtor-in-possession financing to
continue operations. In this type of situation, the bankruptcy court and the
gaming regulators work together to appoint a trustee to take over operations
and make efforts to liquidate the assets. Examples of this type of bankruptcy
were: The Maxim Hotel and Casino54 and Fitzgeralds Reno.55
Regardless of the type of casino bankruptcy, once a bankruptcy petition is
filed, the casino operators’ fiduciary duties shift from that of equity owners of
the company to the bankruptcy estate itself (and more specifically to all of the
creditors). Then, the debtor’s duties (even if a trustee has not been appointed)
become similar to those of a bankruptcy trustee to maximize the eventual distri-
bution to the bankruptcy estate’s creditors.56 The focus then is on allowing the
casino’s operations to continue so as to maximize revenues in order to make it
46 In re Fitzgeralds Gaming Corp., No. 00-33467 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011).
47 In re Aladdin Gaming, LLC., No. 01-20141 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011).
48 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006).
49 See In re Aladdin Gaming, LLC, No. 01-20141.
50 In re The Resort at Summerlin Inc., No. 00-18878 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011).
51 Jorgenson v. State Line Hotel, Inc. (In re State Line Hotel, Inc.), 323 B.R. 703 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2005), vacated 242 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2007).
52 In re High-Five Enter., LLC , No. 10-54013 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (jointly administered
with In re One South Lake Street, LLC., No. 10-54065 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010)).
53 Id.
54 In re Max Gaming, LLC., No. 99-19904 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2000).
55 In re Fitzgeralds Reno, No. 00-33469 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011) (The Reno casino was the
sole remaining asset of Fitzgeralds Gaming Corporation that couldn’t be sold when the buyer
declined to purchase that property along with the other three.).
56 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006) (“a debtor in possession shall have all the rights, . . . powers,
and shall perform all the functions and duties . . . of a trustee . . . .”); In re Reliant Energy
Channel View LP, 594 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 2010) (“debtors-in-possession have a fiduciary
duty to maximize the value of the estate”).
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more likely that all creditor constituency groups are able to recover as much as
possible. Generally, the prior owner’s equity is wiped out and becomes worth-
less, as the equity is last in priority to be paid out under the Bankruptcy Code.57
Once the gaming borrower has filed for bankruptcy, the extensive state
and local gaming regulatory schemes not only complicate, but are often at odds
with the bankruptcy process. Federal bankruptcy law and state and local gam-
ing regulations may present competing goals and requirements. Two goals
underlying the federal bankruptcy process are: providing creditors with pay-
ment and allowing an ongoing business to emerge rehabilitated. On the other
hand, gaming regulations are driven by numerous public policies not at issue in
the bankruptcy process. These public policies include: 1) the protection of con-
sumers; 2) the integrity of the gaming industry as a whole; 3) the control of the
financial practices of gaming businesses; 4) the prevention of unsuitable per-
sons from involvement in gaming; 5) establishing and maintaining appropriate
accounting procedures for gaming enterprises; and 6) maintaining a stable
source of revenue for state and municipalities through tax and licensing
revenues.58
The impact of state regulators upon a gaming bankruptcy is made by its
two-pronged regulatory scheme of controlling the businesses through both
reporting and licensing requirements. The reporting requirements include the
submission of periodic and detailed financing and operating reports, the main-
tenance of stock ledgers that disclose all beneficial owners, and the reporting
and approval of most loans, leases, sales of securities and any other financing
transactions of the gaming business.59 On the other hand, extensive licensing
requirements require, among other things, all officers, directors, and certain key
employees to apply to be licensed or found “suitable” after comprehensive dis-
closure and investigation of detailed personal information at the great expense
of the applicant.60 These requirements are not waived or otherwise limited in
any way by the filing of the bankruptcy case, because the automatic stay nor-
mally given to actions against a debtor in bankruptcy does not apply to the
exercise of “police or regulatory power” by a “governmental unit” to enforce a
non-monetary judgment.61
However, recent Nevada legislation may act to ease the overly burden-
some licensing requirements by allowing entities to file applications for a “pre-
liminary finding of suitability” before first being in a position in which
licensing is mandatory under the Nevada Gaming Control Act.62 As a result, a
party without an existing involvement in Nevada’s gaming industry or an
agreement that gives it a right to such involvement, now has the opportunity to
apply for a preliminary finding of suitability, thereby providing the party with a
57 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (the so-called “Absolute Priority Rule,” which requires that all
unsecured creditors would need to be paid in full to allow any payment to the equity).
58 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0129 (2009).
59 See Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 8.130 (2)-(3). Additionally, other reporting requirements
for licensees are contained in numerous regulation sections.
60 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.170.
61 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
62 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.1625(1).
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means to address and resolve licensing risks prior to entering into a major
transaction or assuming an employment position requiring licensing.
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN GAMING BANKRUPTCIES
In addition to the all-encompassing policy issues, there are also compli-
cated procedural issues. When a debtor files a chapter 11 petition, the “auto-
matic stay” goes into effect, which both prohibits creditors from pursuing
actions against the debtor and prevents the debtor from paying any claims that
arose prior to the filing.63 This “stay” creates a myriad of problems for a gam-
ing business due to the necessary, constant flow of cash and cash equivalents
(vouchers, chips, and tokens) and in light of wagers on future events (as for
keno and sporting events in the sports book). This is because one cannot count
on them being paid out prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition due to the
nature of a casino’s round-the-clock operations.
Therefore, a company beginning the chapter 11 process must immediately
ask the court for certain orders that will allow it to continue uninterrupted oper-
ations during the bankruptcy proceeding—the so-called “first day orders.”
Although these motions are highly irregular in the bankruptcy process insofar
as they request payment of pre-petition, unsecured obligations prior to distribu-
tion to other unsecured creditors (normally inviolate in a bankruptcy case), the
motions are nonetheless essential to the continuation of the gaming enterprise.
They are designed to ensure that the debtor can maintain normal business oper-
ations with customers, employees, suppliers, and other stakeholders and con-
tinue the necessary generation of revenue and compliance with state gaming
laws. The ultimate goal is to allow the debtor to continue generating funds to
support ongoing operations, which will, in turn, permit the debtor to satisfy
creditors and successfully complete its plan of reorganization.
Typically, these “first day orders” allow the debtor to do the following:
pay employees, pay certain important trade creditors or “critical vendors,” pay
taxing authorities, honor room reservations, convention contracts and deposits,
use the existing cash management system already in place, retain attorneys and
other advisors, use estate assets (including cash) to conduct business opera-
tions, and obtain financing to fund the administration of the bankruptcy.64
Because these orders are so crucial, gaming debtors normally arrange in
advance with the bankruptcy court for a hearing date to occur shortly after the
filing of their bankruptcy petition. Moreover, despite the short notice normally
given to the creditors of the estate and other parties in interest, the bankruptcy
courts routinely grant these motions on an interim basis, and then grant a series
of final orders after additional notice time has been given and a continued hear-
ing has occurred.
Gaming authorities may be able to exercise their “police power” to force
the casino to honor obligations to its customers made prior to the bankruptcy
63 11 U.S.C. § 362.
64 See Lynn P. Harrison & James V. Drew, First Day Orders: A Survey of Critical Vendor
Motions and Recent Developments, in PLI’S COURSE HANDBOOK, 31ST ANNUAL CURRENT
DEVELOPMENT IN BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION (2009), available at www.pli.edu/
emktg/toolbox/SurVendor_Motions36.doc.
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filing and to honor the state and local taxes inherent in the business.65 The
Bankruptcy Code technically requires that, upon filing for bankruptcy protec-
tion, a casino is to cease issuing and honoring pre-petition chips and recognize
only new “post-petition chips.”66 However, the bankruptcy court’s “first day
orders” will normally fix this problem and include a grant of authority to
authorize payment of gaming chips and tokens (as well as ticket-in, ticket-out
vouchers) in the ordinary course of business, address claims to casino cash,
honor sports book wagers and deposits, authorize the debtor to retain pre-peti-
tion charge card accounts, honor tour and travel commitments and other pre-
petition room deposits, honor customer incentive programs and other agree-
ments like “Megabucks,” and pay gaming taxes.
Practically, a debtor casino could not compete in the highly competitive
gaming industry if it was required to follow certain requirements of the Bank-
ruptcy Code strictly. Casino customers must be able to exchange their cash for
gaming chips, and the race and sports book and keno operators must be allowed
to accept bets on future events and pay winners on demand. To maintain opera-
tions and to comply with state gaming regulations the casino must honor each
of those pre-petition obligations of the debt post-petition, and do so with no
interruption upon the bankruptcy filing. Due to the role of the gaming authori-
ties, in many cases, the debtor will normally inform the regulators about the
bankruptcy and may even give them an opportunity to comment on certain
relevant “first day orders.”
Obviously, financing of the administration of the bankruptcy is usually of
paramount importance in a gaming case. In the bankruptcy context, post-peti-
tion financing requires the approval of the bankruptcy court, pursuant to Bank-
ruptcy Code section 36467 and, once a petition is filed, lenders cannot be
compelled to provide further loan advances based on pre-petition financing
agreements.68
However, because this funding triggers the same kind of regulatory scru-
tiny as non-bankruptcy funding and is subject to the same constraints,69 loans
to gaming debtors are complex.70 If a debtor needs financing, the senior
65 See infra Part III.
66 Under Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 12.060 of the Nevada Gaming Commission and State
Gaming Control Board, chips and tokens constitute debt. In bankruptcy, chip holders are
considered general unsecured creditors. Generally, casinos pay chip or token debt with cash
reserves inside the gaming establishment. Often, lenders have a security interest in a casino’s
cash reserves or cash collateral. After the filing of a bankruptcy petition, pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(B), a debtor may not use cash collateral without the creditor’s consent or
court order. Furthermore, as discussed supra, the absolute priority rule (11 U.S.C.
§1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)) requires that higher priority creditors be paid in full before lower priority
claimants receive any payment. Additionally, the automatic stay established by 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 prevents creditors from taking any act to collect a pre-petition debt. Taking all these
factors together, a debtor casino is technically not supposed to honor pre-petition chips or
gambling debts. Nevertheless, casinos usually avoid this restriction by filing first day
motions seeking leave of the court to use cash collateral to maintain business operations.
67 See 11 U.S.C. § 364(b)-(d) (2006).
68 See id. § 365(c).
69 Cash perfection issues, non-assignability of the gaming licenses, and regulatory
approvals.
70 Such financing is often called “DIP” financing or “debtor-in-possession” financing.
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secured lenders often provide it in return for the debtor making all encompass-
ing agreements as to the use of cash, budgets, and the exit strategy of the debtor
and the lenders. They may even require an agreement from the debtor as to the
validity and extent of their liens against the debtor’s property and require that
the debtor give up claims against the lenders.
Unfortunately, this cooperation between the debtor and the senior secured
lender may not be enough to ensure liens remain unchallenged or that claims
will not eventually be pursued. A debtor in possession (“DIP”) has all the rights
and powers of a trustee, including the ability to avoid certain liens encumbering
estate property.71 However, if a debtor in possession neglects to take such
action, courts can confer derivative standing upon a third party—assuming cer-
tain criteria can be demonstrated72—to bring actions to recover property for the
benefit of the estate.73
A recent Delaware decision illustrates how derivative standing may arise
in a case involving a debtor that is a gaming entity.74 In In re Centaur, LLC,
the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors sought derivative standing to
challenge the validity of various liens held by the senior secured lenders and
the second lien holders.75 The debtor was a holding company for a variety of
entities operating gaming facilities in several states.76 Among other things, the
Committee challenged the senior secured lenders’ perfection in “cage cash” at
off-track betting locations operated by the debtor’s affiliates.77 Additionally,
the Committee sought to avoid as fraudulent transfers certain liens associated
with “upstream guaranties” from the affiliated gaming entities regarding the
senior secured credit facility.78 Overall, the Committee sought to avoid liens on
estate property worth an estimated $192 million.79
As the primary basis for bringing its motion, the Committee contended
that the debtor unjustifiably refused to bring these actions on behalf of the
estate.80 In support of this contention, the Committee offered expert testimony
that identified a potential recovery for the unsecured creditors of over $85 mil-
lion, if certain liens were avoided.81 To rebut this, the debtor offered testimony
that only $6.55 million would be recovered—just $1.55 million above the high
end estimated litigation costs to pursue the claims.82 Despite these disparities in
71 See supra Part III.
72 In re YES! Entm’t Corp., 316 B.R. 141, 145 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (stating that deriva-
tive standing requires: “(1) a colorable claim, (2) that the trustee unjustifiably refused to
pursue the claim, and (3) the permission of the bankruptcy court to initiate the action.”).
73 See Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2000); Commodore Int’l Ltd. v. Gould (In re
Commodore Int’l Ltd.), 262 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2001); Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors
of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2003); In re YES! Entm’t Corp., 316
B.R. at 141; In re Centaur, LLC., No. 10-10799, 2010 WL 4624910 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 5,
2010).
74 In re Centaur, 2010 WL 4624910, at *1.
75 Id.
76 Id. at *1-2.
77 Id. at *4.
78 Id.
79 Id. at *1.
80 Id. at *5-7.
81 Id. at *5.
82 Id. at *5-6.
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value, the Centaur court granted derivative standing to the Committee.83 In
reaching this determination, the court concluded:
Under these circumstances, and understanding there may indeed be some benefit to
the estate [itself] if some or all of the claims are prosecuted successfully, and to
achieve the appropriate balance between allowing pursuit of colorable Claims and
ensuring benefit to the estate, [the court] will grant the Committee’s request for
standing to prosecute the Claims . . . .84
Thus, as Centaur demonstrates, even if a debtor agrees to the validity of
certain liens or the forfeiture of certain claims to obtain DIP financing, such
agreements can still be challenged by other parties in interest in the case.
Although these agreements benefit a debtor by allowing it to continue its opera-
tions, a strong argument exists that the forfeiture of such claims potentially
harms other creditors by minimizing the bankruptcy estate. As expected, the
greater the magnitude of the claim a debtor waives, the more likely a third party
may be granted derivative standing to pursue the potential benefit for the estate.
Although derivative standing presents a potential difficulty in a casino
reorganization, other obstacles are more certain. Like all casino financing, DIP
financing requires the licensees to provide the appropriate notices to the gam-
ing authorities.85 If such notification is not done, state gaming regulators could
attempt to rescind the financing arrangement or take other disciplinary action
against the casino debtor, notwithstanding prior approval by the bankruptcy
court.86 However, in many bankruptcies, additional DIP financing is not
needed because the debtor’s operations still generate sufficient revenues to sup-
port its operations. Nevertheless, in such a case, there may still be negotiations
over the definition and use of the lender’s cash collateral, as both are instru-
mental to the success of the debtor’s reorganization.
Additionally, and of key importance to a debtor, once the case is ongoing,
the debtor has the ability to accept, assume, and assign, or reject executory
contracts. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define an “executory con-
tract,” the legislative history of section 365 adopts the Countryman87 definition
of such contracts as those “on which performance remains due to some extent
on both sides.”88 In the context of a gaming business, executory contracts
would include leases of gaming devices such as slot and video poker machines.
However, it must be noted that this key ability to accept or reject contracts
in bankruptcy is limited by gaming regulations, which may impact the timing
of any proposed assignment, as well as limiting the group of persons or entities
to which those contracts are assigned.
83 Id. at *7.
84 Id.
85 See Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 8.130 (2011).
86 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 463 (2009).
87 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439,
447 (1973); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 34, at ¶ 365.02[1].
88 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 34, at ¶ 365.02[1].
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IV. EXIT STRATEGIES
The goal of every bankruptcy debtor is to exit from bankruptcy. During a
chapter 11 case the debtor will propose a plan of reorganization based on its
negotiations with creditors in order to accomplish that exit. There are several
restructuring alternatives available to casino debtors seeking protection under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Among these alternatives is the refinancing
of outstanding debt, selling assets pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code or a plan of reorganization, a “friendly foreclosure” or converting debt to
equity. Most plans of reorganization will include a combination of some or all
of these restructuring alternatives.
In many cases, the easiest restructuring alternative available to a casino
debtor is to refinance its existing debt. Lenders need to be aware that, as with
the initial debt transaction itself, when a casino debtor proposes to refinance
existing debt, the lenders are subject to being called forward by gaming regula-
tors for full suitability investigations.89 Gaming regulators generally have the
discretion to call lenders forward for licensing, but this is rarely exercised so
long as the lenders are bona fide banking institutions. In addition, the refinanc-
ing of debt may require the prior approval of the gaming authorities.90 Thus,
the debtor’s ability to obtain the bankruptcy court’s approval of its plan of
reorganization will likely be dependent on the lender and/or the proposed trans-
action also being approved by the gaming authorities.
An equity swap is another restructuring option available to a casino
debtor. In order to effectuate the equity swap, a significant amount of the
debtor’s creditors must accept the debtor’s plan of reorganization (at least two-
thirds in amount and a majority in number of those creditors voting in the class
whose claims will be subject to conversion into equity of the reorganized
entity).91 An equity swap will likely create gaming licensing issues for the
lenders, the result of which will vary depending upon the nature of the entity in
bankruptcy (public or private) and the jurisdictions in which that company does
business.92
A third restructuring option available to a casino debtor is to sell its assets
to a third party. Any sale of assets by the casino debtor is subject to the bank-
ruptcy court’s approval, as well as gaming regulatory approval.93 An asset sale
may be very beneficial to a creditor who is either unwilling or unable to
undergo the licensing or suitability scrutiny required in an equity swap. In the
sale process, only the buyer and its insiders and affiliates will undergo such
scrutiny. However, there are potential downsides for creditors with an asset
sale. Most importantly, the asset sale is not guaranteed to yield the best recov-
ery for creditors. Additionally, there is no assurance that the buyer will be able
to obtain the required licenses in a timely manner and complete the sale.
89 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.165, 463.167 (2009).
90 See id. § 463.165.
91 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006).
92 Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 8.030 requires any new owner to obtain licensing from the
Commission.
93 11 U.S.C. § 363; Nev. Gaming Comm’n Reg. 8.030 (1975).
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Lenders may be able to avail themselves of certain licensing exemptions
(i.e., public company status of the bankrupt entity, institutional investor status
for members of the lending group, non-voting stock), but if the lenders want to
have an operational role with members of its constituency serving as officers,
directors or key employees (or otherwise exercising control over casino opera-
tions), then these individuals would need to be identified and go through the
full licensing process. Many large institutions and other creditors may not want
their organizations or management to be subject to the intense regulatory
review. Until a creditor is found to be suitable by the gaming authorities, it
cannot receive as a distribution an equity interest in the reorganized debtor
under the plan of reorganization.94
In regard to the various chapter 11 bankruptcy scenarios described above,
any plan of reorganization or sale would need to be submitted to all applicable
gaming regulatory agencies for a licensing investigation and approval, even
after the bankruptcy court approval is obtained. This essentially means that the
debtor retains control of the operation pending the license investigation and
approval, thus stalling the progress of the reorganization.
The gaming license investigations that may be necessary in such instances
can range from a full-blown, new gaming investigation of a company that has
never been licensed before in a jurisdiction (which would take the most time),
to an updated investigation of a company that is already licensed in a jurisdic-
tion. Of course, the more jurisdictions in which a gaming company does busi-
ness, the more gaming regulatory agencies that come into play.
V. GOING FORWARD
Despite some slow growth in casino revenues over the last several years,
the effects of the current economic climate are significant, from credit tighten-
ing to unemployment, and to limitations on discretionary income and spending.
Yet, despite having to weather these storms, the casino industry is continuing to
evolve as courts, regulators, lenders, casino companies, and equity owners still
face the challenges posed by the ongoing financial crises and the difficulties
that the necessary intersection between gaming regulations and bankruptcy stat-
utes presents. As these conditions continually evolve, sophisticated restructur-
ing professionals and advisors continue to innovate, providing the necessary
strategic planning and support for finding new and creative ways to restructure
gaming businesses in accordance with state and federal laws, and to keep them
operating.
94 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.160(1)(d).
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